Policy alternatives in Soviet environmental protection. by Ziegler, Charles E.
University of Louisville 
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository 
Faculty Scholarship 
1981 
Policy alternatives in Soviet environmental protection. 
Charles E. Ziegler 
University of Louisville, charles.ziegler@louisville.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, International Relations 
Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons 
Original Publication Information 
This paper was originally published as part of the Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies 
journal, no. 102, in 1981. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The 
University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu. 
.POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
by
CHARLES E. ZIEGLER
Paper No . 102
1981
Charles E. Ziegler i s Assistant Professor of Politi cal Science
at the University of Louisville. He received the Ph.D. in .
political science from the Universi ty of Illinois at Champaign-
Urbana, and has publ ished articles on environmental policy and
political specialization in Soviet Studies, The International
Journal of Political Education, and Studies in Sovi et Thought.
Dr . Ziegler is currently working on a study of environmental
policy in the Soviet Union .
THE CARL BECKPAPERS IN
RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES





A number of developments over the past decade or so illustrate the in-
creasing salience of environmental problems for Soviet policy makers. In
the mid-1960s, controversy over the potential pollution of Lake Baikal appears
to have stimulated and legitimized environmental protection as an issue for
discussion in the Soviet press. l The output of scholarly books and arti-
cles by philosophers, economists, biologists, physicists, and sociologists
reflects the broad range of organizations concerned with these questions. 2
Support is also evident in high p1aces-Brezhnev's report to the 25th Party
Congress in 1976 emphasized the importance of environmental protection and
announced that 11 billion rubles would be allocated for the purpose during
the tenth five-year plan. 3 N.K. Baibakov, Chairman of the State Planning
Committee recently outlined planned capital investments of 1.8 billion rubles
for the implementation of environmental protection measures in 1981. 4
Greater organizational commitment is evident in the elevation of the former
Hydrometeorology Service attached to the Council of Ministers to a State
Committee on Hydrometeorology and Oversight of the Environment. The com-
mittee's director, Dr. Iu. Izrael, claimed his organization had approximately
510,000 personnel working on environmental problems as of early 1979.
Despite the considerable support for environmental protection evidenced
in budgetary allocations, press coverage, scientific research and bureau-
cratic reorganization, Soviet policy makers appear to be uncertain about the
precise form environmental policy should assume. Uncertain!" regardin~ an en-
vironmental solution is closely tied to the broader problem of economic re-
6
form in the Soviet Union. Constraints on labor and capital resources have
slowed extensive economic growth in the past two decades, resulting in pro-
grams and pronouncements designed to achieve more efficient use of extant re-
sources. The programs of the last two Party Congresses reflect the determination
2to stimulate intensive economic growth through technology and efficient
management practices. Economic reform has been accepted in principle by the
Soviet leadership, although there is substantial disagreement over the actual
measures to be adopted. 7
In an attempt to stimulate greater efficiency in utilizing natural re-
sources, labor and capital, leaders at the highest level have urged the use
of economic levers and incentives in place of administrative actions. 8
With the encouragement and legitimacy conferred by such pronouncements, a
number of Soviet economists have advanced innovative proposals embodying
market or other economic incentives to environmental protection. This paper
examines the alternative approaches to environmental policy problems-economic
and administra,tive-available to Soviet policy makers. The approach adopted,
in the form of national environmental legislation enacted, gives some indica-
tion of the capacity of the Soviet system to entertain new ideas and incorpor-
ate them into public policy.
The first section of this paper describes some of the more innovative,
non-incremental solutions to environmental pollution advanced by Soviet
economists. The second part outlines the actual response of the Soviet
government to pollution problems, which consists largely of incremental ad-
ministrative arrangements. Several of the more important environmental laws
will be reviewed in this section. The concluding section makes some general
observations about the openness of environmental policy debate in the USSR,
and the selection and implementation of alternative environmental strategies.
POLICY ALTERNATIVES: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
As Charles Lindblom has observed, "communist systems rely on authority
3far more than do the market-oriented polyarchies. 1l 9 Soviet leaders use some
market mechanisms (to allocate labor, for example), but they prefer to exer-
cise control through authority rather than through exchange. The willingness
to experiment with and use market mechanisms has increased in the post-Stalin
era; this is, of course, a primary aspect of Soviet "liberalization" during
this period.
Previous research indicated that private ownership of natural resources
is the only major economic incentive decisively rejected by Soviet decision
makers.10 Virtually all other types of economic incentives would appear to be
ideologically acceptable. Since the mid-1960s Soviet economists have proposed
a variety of economic solutions to environmental problems. One category of
solutions attempts to force polluters to internalize external costs generated
in the production process. To the extent that economic levers have become
part of policy, the governmental response has been to adopt a second
broad division of economic incentives--paying polluters to stop polluting.
Paying Polluters
Prior to 1975 the Soviet government expected polluting enterprises and
organizations to pay for environmental protection measures using money from
the enterprise development fund. The fund is a sum of money set aside for
capital investment, and for enterprises to make improvements in organization
and production techniques. The effectiveness of the fund in raising effi-
ciency has been weakened by the small size of the fund and by overly central-
ized control through the ministry.ll Ministry officials are reluctant to
invest in projects which may tend to reduce overall output or which incur
continuing costs. Measures aimed at preventing waste or purifying discharges
do both. By 1975, the national economic plan did include specific budgetary
4allocations for preventing pollution, mandating the expenditure of funds. 12
If enterprise directors did not use monies from the fund, they were ex-
pected to divert part of their general budget to pay for the construction of
purification facilities, to restore strip-mined land, etc. Directors were·
understandably reluctant to jeopardize plan fulfillment by shifting resources
away from "productive ll activities. Success and failure in the Soviet system
of central planning are based largely on physical output. Additional cri-
teria have been added since the 1965 economic reforms, but the quantitative
indicator retains its position of primary importance.13 The rational enter-
prise director will devote all available resources to maximizing production
of the limited number of products, since their output constitutes his major
criterion of success. Salary bonuses, recognition and promotion are contin-
gent upon these criteria.
The bonus system is a form of economic incentive that has become institu-
tionalized in the Soviet system. Logically, in a system where the productive
resources are owned and operated by the state, bonuses awarded to individuals
should be greatest in the sectors having the highest priority. There is
empirical evidence that such a correlation does exist in the Soviet Union. 14
The largest bonuses go to the military and intelligence sectors, then heavy
industry, and finally light industry. To the present time, bonuses have not
been awarded for successes in environmental protection efforts, although
Soviet authors have suggested the adoption of this practice. 15
Although bonuses are not awarded for protecting the environment, they
may be denied for failure to comply with environmental directives. A 1979
resolution of the State Committee on Labor and Social Questions and the Cen-
tral Council of Trade Unions stipulated that executive personnel of organizations
and enterprises failing to implement environmental plans and measures would
5forfeit a minimum of 25 percent of whatever bonus they had earned. This ap-
plies to factory managers, heads of urban services organizations, their de-
puties and chief engineers. If these individuals violate state plans for the
national economy they may lose the full amount of any earned bonus. 16 Since
bonuses often amount to one-third or even one-half of managerial salaries,
this could be a significant incentive if applied consistently.
The incorporation of environmental protection into the state plan in
1975 was one indication of the increasing importance of this policy area for
the Soviet leadership. This change in policy was partly symbolic and partly
functional. Symbolically, the official status of environmental protection
was elevated from a local or regional matter to a position of national impor-
tance. It reinforced the earlier national commitment symbolized in the Septem-
ber 1975 session of the Supreme Soviet on conservation and the environment.
Functionally, specific sums were to be allocated and spent for the pro-
tection of air and water. Theoretically, enterprises and organizations would
no longer be expected to pay for equipment and maintenance costs out of the
basic fund. In recent years, however, directors have been pressured by the
Kremlin to use money from the basic fund for environmental protection. Fur-
thermore, the amounts allocated for environmental protection are apparently
insufficient, given the weakness of the present infrastructure when compared
with what is needed for a successful policy. Serious pollution violations
often occur because obsolete factories and plants cannot utilize modern
abatement equipment. 17
Capital investment in environmental protection grew rapidly in the two
years following the 1972 Supreme Soviet session, peaked in 1975, declined
over the next two years, then rebounded slightly. Table One indicates the
6pattern of national expenditures. Brezhnev announced that 11 billion rubles
would be spent for environmental protection in the course of the Tenth Five
Year Plan. 18 The data presented in Table One suggests that unless expendi-
tures increased drastically in 1980, just under two billion rubles remained
unspent.
Originally, plans had provided for expenditures of 5.8 billion rubles
in 1976-1978, including 4.7 billion for construction and installation. 19
Several union republics--the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic,
Georgia, and B)elorussia--failed to allocate the full amount of capital invest-
ment. The USSR Ministry of Coal Industry and the USSR Ministry of Ferrous
20Metallurgy also did not spend the full amounts allocated to them in the plan.
How can we explain these failures to utilize the full amounts allocated?
The source of the problem may be found in the balance of economic priorities
existing in the Soviet system of central economic planning. A certain sum may
be allocated, say, for the construction of purification installations, but
construction enterprises must first fulfill their assignments for priority pro-
jects. 2l At present there is only one organization, the All-Union Gas Puri-
fication and Dust Trapping Association, whose sole task is the production and
distribution of anti-pollution equipment. Created nearly four decades ago,
the Association was assigned to the USSR Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum
Machine Building Industry by the Supreme Soviet in 1972. Earlier reports in-
dicated that the Association was unable to meet the demand for air pollution
equipment,22 but its performance has improved in recent years. 23
No such organization exists to manufacture equipment for treating effluent
discharged into waterways. Several institutes carry out basic research on
water pollution and purification equipment, such as the All-Union Research
Institute for Water Supply, Sewage and Hydrological Engineering Equipment. 24
TABLE I
State Capital Investments in Measures for the Protection and Rational Utilization
of Natural Resources (in comparable prices, millions of rubles)




1200 857 1143 1528 2084 1887 1783
917 1242 1383 1430 1390







Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1977g: statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Statistika, 1978),
pp. 348, 445; Narkhoz 1979, p. 445.
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Construction is generally the responsibility of the relevant construction
ministry.
In sum, the construction and installation of purification facilities
is a low-priority item for virtually all organizations within the economic
bureaucracy. These organizations have higher-order tasks that require time
and attention; and environmental protection is strictly secondary as an or-
ganizational goal. It does not "pay" for an enterprise to devote the 20-30
percent of its basic fund that is often necessary to purify effluents ade-
quately.25 The easiest solution is simply not to make use of the limited
funds that have been allocated. 26
The Polluter Pays
The second broad range of alternatives involving economic incentives
assumes that polluters should pay the social costs incurred through produc-
tion. The theoretical framework on which this assumption is based has been
developed by Western economists within the context of market economies. As
I will demonstrate shortly, these principles of economic theory are also
applicable to the command economy.
Theoretically, pollution and resource waste occur when the market
mechanism fails to produce an accurate valuation of natural resources. If
it is possible to better the lot of at least one member of society without
diminishing the well-being of any other member, then resources are being
used inefficiently. Resource allocation, in economist~ terms, has fallen
short of Pareto optimality. The Pareto optimum is the theoretical point at
which all productive resources are utilized (and valued) just equal to their
most valuable alternative use. This alternative value, or opportunity cost,
is determined through supply and demand in a competitive market economy. Since
the value of all resources is maximized, social welfare is maximized and
9resource "waste" (inefficient use or pollution) reduced to a minimum. 27
In practice, environmental resources are often undervalued because they
are not exchanged through the market. These resources have opportunity costs,
although the opportunity costs are not reflected in the market price. Thus,
firms using the undervalued resources pay only part of the cost. The re-
mainder "spi11s over" into other sectors in the form of technical or physical
effects. Economists refer to these phenomena as technological external dis-
economies. 28
Official Soviet doctrine maintains that the elimination of private capi-
tal confers a systemic environmental advantage on the USSR by eliminating
external diseconomies. 29 Most Soviet writers, however, acknowledge the exis-
tence of tensions and contradictions between national priorities and the in-
terests of ministries, departments, and enterprises. 3D One writer candidly
argued that "nationa1 economic altruism cannot be a realistic basis for branch
economic po1icies. 1I 31 Symbolic appeals to promote the general welfare were
acknowledged to be ineffective. The solution he proposed, however, involved
an increased role for central planning and coordination rather than using
economic incentives.
Other Soviet economists have advocated schemes that would force enter-
prises to absorb some or all of the external costs incurred in production. 32
One of the first, V. Shkatov, suggested the adoption of differential rents
determined by a scale of cadastre (an official register of land or natural
resources) prices for natural resources. The cadastre would indicate the
quantity and value of natural resources such as land, oil, and mineral de-
posits, and would take into account the location and transportation costs of
these resources. 33 Users of natural resources would pay for them according
to a system of "po1ar prices." Under conditions of maximum ease of extraction,
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transportations and value, enterprises would pay a positive sum. Under dif-
ficult conditions enterprises would receive a payment from the state, and
under average conditions the price for resources would be zero. 34
Application of this system of polar prices to the use of natural re-
sources would partly compensate for the inefficient exploitation of resources
encouraged by the absence of fixed costs for extraction firms. 35 Shkatov
suggested that the principle of polarity could also be applied to effluents.
The release of one cubic meter of heavily polluted water, for example, might
result in a charge of three kopeks subtracted from profits or from the basic
fund. Conversely, a premium of two kopeks could be paid to the enterprise
per cubic meter of fully cleaned waste water. 36
Other Soviet economists have argued that pollution problems exist be-
cause the principles of economic accountability do not apply to pollution
control. A record is kept of the outlays provided .for environmental protec-
tion, but there is no mechanism for measuring success in terms of actual re-
sults. The authors of an article inVoprosy ekonomiki in 1972 suggested im-
posing a pollution charge on enterprises to induce adoption of a least-cost
approach to po1lution. 37 N. G. Feitelman, writing in the same journal six
years later, also supported the idea of an environmental pollution charge
factored into the unit costs of production. 38 Feitelman stressed the need
for an economic valuation of natural resources--he specifically mentioned the
possibility of allowing enterprises to sell incidental resources not pro-
vided for in the plan--and urged that fines be revised to reflect external
costs more accurately;39
Enterprises and associations may sell valuable by-products to other en-
terprises and keep the income for themselves. The red tape involved in
obtaining departmental and ministerial approval for such an exchange can be
11'
overwhelming, though. Komarov relates the case of a chemical plant in Kras-
noiarsk territory which attempted to sell the valuable flourine it was pumping
into the atmosphere. Both the seller and potential buyer were departments
within the same Ministry of Chemical Industry. Nevertheless, the Krasnoiarsk
plant continued to pollute the atmosphere with flourine for over five years
until final approval was granted. 40
As industrialization spreads throughout the world accompanied by the in-
creasing consumption of fossil fuels, policy makers are finally realizing
that even the earth's atmosphere is a limited resource, though renewable to
a point. The concept of selling rights to use increments of atmospheric re-
sources has recently gained acceptance among U.S. policy makers, and has been
implemented by a number of states. 4l In the Soviet Union, no such charge for
the use of air as a "dumping ground" has been implemented in any systematic
way, and charges for the use of water have only been introduced experimentally.
The present policy toward water usage involves supplying the user with water
free of charge, or requiring the user to pay a minimal fee to the state. 42
The practice of fining enterprises and enterprise directors for viola-
tions of environmental laws is another means of forcing the polluter to bear
the costs. However, fines are generally very low. Inspectors of the Sanitary
Epidemiological Service may fine individuals 50 to 100 rubles, and an enter-
prise 500 rubles. Smaller fines may be imposed by the chief sanitary physi-
cian. 43 Soviet officials have complained about the
. erroneous and incomplete application of fines and
compensations for damages and low efficiency of credit and
financing system stimulation . . . Analysis of the data on
efficiency of fines for discharge of untreated or insuffi-
ciently treated effluents into streams and/or water bodies
12
has demonstrated that the sums of fines per one violation
are much lower than the cost of harmful effects inflicted on
the national economy.44
In the mid-1970s, a document was drawn up for the economic valuation of
natural resources entitled "Basic Regulations on Methods for the Economic
Valuation of National Resources in Large-Scale Plan and Design Calculations. 1I
It was reported that a number of branches had begun to implement these regula-
tions by 1975,45 but later publications indicate that the intent of this do-
cument was never fully realized. 46 Wasteful use of cheap or free natural re-
sources lowers unit costs for enterprises and raises profits. 47 The overall
effect is to subsidize firms that waste resources while economically penalizing
firms which adopt stringent environmental standards.
Economic concepts of opportunity costs and externalities can be applied
to both market and command economies. If prices are viewed in the generic
sense of IIterms on which alternatives are offered ll rather than simply as ex-
change ratios in a market, accounting prices or provisional valuations may be
established in a non-market economy for the purpose of allocating resources. 48
Soviet economists have almost uniformly supported the concept of an economic
valuation of natural resources to reflect their most valuable alternative
uses. These same economists recognize that externalities exist in the Soviet
socialist economy. They locate the source of these external costs in the
functional divisions of the ministerial system, which suggests that externali-
ties result from the distribution of organization rather than the distribution
of property. The implication is clear-administrative reorganization is needed
to realize the effectiveness of economic approaches. In the following section
Soviet administrative organization is analyzed as it relates to environmental
protection.
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ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION: INCREMENTALIST SOLUTIONS
Soviet national environmental legislation is based on the premise that
adequate institutional mechanisms exist for enforcing environmental protec-
tion. An important 1973 joint resolution of the Central Committee and the
Council of Ministers instructed the Union Republic Central Committees and
Councils of Ministers, the area (krai) and regional (ob1ast) Party committees,
the autonomous republic Councils of Ministers, area and regional executive
committees, and USSR ministries and departments to intensify supervision and
to establish systematic control over the implementation of environmental pro-
tection measures.49 The Hydrometeorologtcal Service, an organization at-
tached to the Council of Ministers, was instructed to organize a nationwide
monitoring and control system for levels of air, water, and soil pollution.
The USSR State Committee for Science and Technology was given the responsi-
bility for coordinating research on conservation and the rational utilization
of natural resources. A Chief Administration for the Development and Pro-
. duction of Gas-Purifying and Dust-Trapping Equipment was formed under the
aegis of the USSR Ministry of Chemistry and Petroleum Machine Building for
supervising the operation of purification equipment. 50
A 1978 resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of
Ministers went further toward centralizing environmental protection than any
previous legislation, yet it did not vest control in a single superagency as
many environmenta1istshad suggested. 51 The most notable change was the eleva-
tion of the Main Hydrometeoro10gica1 Service to a State Committee on Hydro-
meteorology and the Environment (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Gidrometerologii
i Kontroliu Prirodnoi Sredy,or "Gidromet" in Soviet parlance), currently
headed by Dr. Iuri Izrael. 52
14
By making this agency a state committee, the Soviet leaders have granted
it autonomy from the ministerial system (Gidromet was formerly under the con-
trol of the Ministry of Health). The function of state committees, such as
the People's Control Committee (KNK) and the better known Committee for State
Security (KGB), is to provide the USSR Council of Ministers with a means of
control over the entire ministerial structure. The new responsibilities of
the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and the Environment were to organize
a monitoring system for the natural environment, regulate air use in urban and
industrial centers, to draft and monitor norms for permissible levels of air
pollution, and to monitor the siting of facilities in order to prevent atmos-
pheric pollution. The new state committee was furthermore
given the right to check on the observance by enterprises,
institutions, organizations, construction projects and other
facilities, regardless of their departmental affiliation, of
norms and rules in the field of atmospheric protection, and
also to submit proposals on suspending the operation of
industrial facilities that are violating established norms
until the necessary measures have been carried out. 53
But the law also vested supervisory powers over the fulfillment of state plan
assignments in several ministries in addition to Gidromet--the Ministry of
Land Reclamation and Water Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the
Council of Ministers' Committee for the Supervision of Industrial Supervision
and Mine Safety.54
It should also be noted that Gidromet was primarily assigned responsibi-
lity for air pollution. Primary responsibility for water pollution remains
with the Sanitary Epidemiological Service of the Ministry of Health, although
this responsibility is shared with the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water
15
Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Fish Industry and
others. Similarly, the duties of protecting forest resources and the soil
are divided among several ministries and agencies. In sum, although there
has been limited movement toward centralization of environmental protection,
responsibility remains divided among a substantial number of organizations.
In addition to the two joint resolutions discussed above there have
been six major environmental laws adopted in the past decade. These are the
Principles of Water Legislation (1970), Principles of Land Use (1968), Princi-
ples of Mineral Legislation (1975), Principles of Forestry Legislation (1977),
and the laws on air quality and the animal world (1980).55
These legislative enactments are remarkably similar in structure and
emphasis. State ownership is proclaimed as the basis for utilizing the
natural resources in question. The legislative goals stated include both the
protection and preservation of these resources, combined with their most
efficient and complete exploitation.
Water use in the USSR is free of charge in most cases (subject to a fee
in special instances), and water use is available to state cooperative, and
public organizations, enterprises and institutions, and citizens. Users have
the right to use water only for the purposes for which it has been granted,
they must utilize water rationally and are obligated to take steps toward the
complete cessation of pollutant discharge into bodies of water. Protection
of water quality and conservation of water constitute the obligations of en-
terprises, organizations and institutions using water. Regulation is coor-
dinated with the relevant agencies, the execut"ive committees of local soviets,
and in certain cases specially empowered state agencies. Violators of USSR
and Union Republic water legislation are criminally or administratively liable
in accordance with the relevant legislation. Users are not required to make
16
restitution to the state for losses. 56
Use of the earth's interior is assigned free of charge, aside from
special instances established by the USSR Council of Ministers, to state,
cooperative and public organizations, institutions and enterprises, and
citizens. Because of the nonrenewable nature of mineral resources, the
legislation stipulates that utilization must be scientifically substantiated
and rational. Users are responsible for the fullest possible recovery of
minerals and for preventing pollution of the earth's interior. In actuality,
mineral resources are often under-utilized because of the low fixed costs of
extraction. A mining concern subject to diminishing marginal returns at one
location need not worry about absorbing the fixed costs of purchasing a new
site, since land is a free good. 57 Furthermore, the enterprise pays only
about 40% of the geological prospecting costs; the state picks up the rest. 58
Both factors provide an incentive to waste natural resources. On the conser-
vation side, enterprises which have higher rates of return due to favorable
conditions are subject to higher turnover taxes. 59 This is similar in effect
to Shkatov's system of polar prices discussed above. Violations of mineral
legislation may incur criminal, administrative, or other liability in accord-
ance with USSR and Union Republic legislation. The "other" liability mentioned
here apparently refers to material restitution. Enterprises, organizations,
institutions and individuals (officials and other personnel) are held materi-
ally liable, in Article 50, for violations. GO Supervision over the use of
the earth's interior is exercised by the relevant agencies, the soviets and
their administrative and executive agencies, with the assistance of public
organizations whenever possible.
Of the six pieces of legislation, only the "Principles of Forest Legisla-
tion" embodies a charge for the use of a natural resource. Standing timber
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is allocated through payment of a fee based on fixed rates. At least one
Soviet writer has complained that the rate per tree does not fully reflect
timber va1ue.51 Nevertheless, instituting a fixed charge for a resource re-
presents a new departure for Soviet policy. Although it is going too far to
argue that this clearly signals a rethinking of the form of Soviet environ-
mental policy, there does appear to be a chronological progression toward
greater use of economic incentives.
Forest users may be state, cooperative and public enterprises, organi-
zations, and institutions, and individual citizens. They may use forest re-
sources only according to the authorization granted them by the state. Forest
users are required to make the fullest and most rational possible use of tim-
ber, must clean up tinlber-cutting areas and recondition exploited land areas
at their own expense. As with the use of mineral resources, actual Soviet
timbering has been incredibly wasteful. Thousands of tons of lumber rot each
year because of inadequate storage and transportation. 52
In the case of land use, usufruct is granted free of charge to collec-
tive and state farms, industrial and public organizations, and citizens.
Land users are obliged to use the land rationally, to protect and improve
soil fertility, and to take the necessary steps against erosion and contami-
nation. State control over land use is exercised by the Soviets and their
executive and administrative organs, and by the relevant state agencies. Vio-
lators of the land legislation are subject to criminal or administrative
liability in accordance with USSR or Union Republic legislation. In addition,
enterprises, institutions, organizations and citizens are obligated to compen-
sate the state for any damage caused from violations of the legislation.
Efficient land use in the Soviet Union is hindered by the same factors
that preclude the most efficient exploitation of mineral resources. These
18
include a fragmented bureaucratic approach to land utilization and the absence
of scarcity prices. According to one student of Soviet land use policy, the
task of assigning more rational values to land use received increased atten-
tion in the late 1970s.63
The laws on air quality and animal protection both went into effect
January 1, 1981. The air quality legislation contains a small article em-
powering the Union Republics (and the USSR) to establish material and moral
incentives for implementing the 1aws. 64 Violators of air quality legislation
are obligated to make recompense for any damages caused through air pollution.
Aside from these modest provisions, the legislation relies on administrative
arrangements to achieve compliance. It should be pointed out, however, that
the administrative procedures and penalties are considerably more sophisticated
and far-reaching than earlier legislation. 65
The use of the animal world is assigned f~ee of charge, although USSR
and Union Republic legislation may establish charges for the use of animal
resources.
66 Compensation for damages may be required of users, but the evi-
dence suggests that poachers generally are not subject to large fines. In
any case, those guilty of poaching tend to come from the ranks of the privi-




The economic alternatives discussed in this paper appear to merit serious
consideration by Soviet policy makers-they all fall within the parameters of
acceptability of the system.68 Soviet leaders are willing to have a variety
of alternate strategies proposed and discussed in the official press, though
few of the economic solutions proposed for solving environmental problems have
actually been implemented. The willingness to entertain and on occasion ex-
periment with alternate strategies indicates a certain flexibility on the
part of the Soviet leadership. Flexibility at the top levels of the Party and
government, however, may be frustrated by the bureaucratic intransigence of
local Party and state organizations. 69 Central decision makers are constrained
in their selection and evaluation of alternatives as a result of certain path-
ologies in the structure of the Soviet command economy. For example, policy
makers often receive distorted information on environmental performance through
the ministerial structure, or find that ministries and departments conveniently
disregard environmental regulations. 70
These findings should not surprise students of Soviet politics, or students
of administrative organization. The complex of penalties and rewards found
in the Soviet planned economy reflect the "bias" of that system toward pro-
duction rather than environmental protection. The commitment of the Soviet
leadership to environmental protection, although substantial, is obviously
secondary to the commitment to industrial development. Viewed from this per-
spective, bureaucratic obstructionism is eminently rational, for it serves the
interests of both the organizations and the individual members. Plans are
fulfilled, deadlines met, bonuses earned. The implementation of environmental
protection measures may in most cases be delayed in deference to more immediate
20
and more crucial goals.
Given the inability of the Soviet leadership to agree on a specific ap-
proach to environmental problems, as suggested by the vague, general character
of the earlier environmental legislation, this policy arena has been opened
to input by such groups as the environmental economists. 7l Open debate means
accessibility, but it also means competition with the established bureau-
cratic interests in the ministerial structure. In the Soviet Union, the key
political resource is organization. Soviet reformers may have complete access
to the press and the top leadership, but they do not have the organizational
resources which would enable them to compete effectively with the economic
bureaucracy.
The result, in terms of policy outputs, is at best an incremental pro-
cess of change. Over time, a series of incremental changes may yield major
differences in policies. The new air quality law, for example, is a fairly
sophisticated piece of legislation incorporating effective administrative
regulations (such as the maximum permissible emissions standards). This law,
which will be implemented primarily through a newly empowered state committee
(Gidromet), could go far toward reducing air pollution in the Soviet Union.
Much will depend on the resistance of polluting organizations to the new re-
gulations, and on the extent of the powers ~ranted to Gidromet. At the time
of this writing, it is too early to ascertain the scope of Gidromet's authority
to regulate pollution violators. The future of this organization should pro-
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